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The Developing Test for State

Regulatory Jurisdiction in
Indian Country: Application in the
Context of Environmental Law
The extent of state jurisdiction over Indians and Indians lands has
created conflicts between the federal, state, and tribal governments
since the nation's inception.' Congressional responses to this inveterate
problem have fluctuated significantly.2 At times, Congress has favored
the assimilation of Indians into the majority society and the destruction
of tribal identities, 3 with consequent increases in state jurisdiction. At
other times, Congress has favored separatism for Indians and the
4
preservation of tribal cultures and governments.
Despite congressional fluctuations, states have consistently attempted
to exercise jurisdiction in Indian country.' In 1832, the Supreme Court,
1 See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) ; Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823) ; Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
2

See S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY (1973); Wilkinson & Biggs,
The Evolution of Termination Policy, 5 Amt. INDIAN L. REV. 139 (1977). See
generally P. MAXFIELD, M. DIETRICH & F. TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
17-38 (1977). Congressional fluctuations such as
"[r]emoval, allotment, reorganization, and termination [have] coincided with significant historical trends in the demand for and availability of natural resources."
R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY
289 (1980).
3 See, e.g., General Allotment (Dawes) Act, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24
Stat. 388; H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953) (Congress adopted a "termination" policy).
4 See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,
25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1976) ; Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 14511543 (1976) ; Indian Reorganization (Wheeler- Howard) Act, Act of June 18,
1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-492 (1976)) ; Indian
Removal Act, Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat, 411; The Non-Intercourse
Act, Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (for a list of other Non-Intercourse
Acts, see P. MAXFIELD, M. DIETRICH & F. TRELEASE, supra note 2, at 20 n.15).
5 See Note, Taxation: State Transaction Privilege Tax: An Interference
With Tribal Self-Government, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 319, 332 (1979).
Congress defined Indian country in 1948:
[T]he term "Indian country," as used in this chapter, means (a) all
land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS

[561]
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in the seminal case of Worcester v. Georgia,6 held that state laws had
no effect within Indian reservations. Since Worcester, the Court has
allowed increasingly significant state incursions into tribal sovereignty
8
7
in response to state pressures. In two landmark cases, Williams v. Lee
in 1959 and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission9 in 1973,
the Court attempted to resolve a morass of decisions I ° into a coherent
doctrine of state jurisdiction in Indian country. Each case not only
upheld greater state incursions into tribal sovereignty than permissible
under previous decisions but also heralded even further incursions. In
the wake of the most recent decisions regarding state regulatory jurisdiction," the case law is once again in disarray. 12 The potential for
further unprecedented state incursions into tribal sovereignty exists
despite the professed current congressional policy to encourage tribal
self-determination.' 3
States are likely to seek these unprecedented incursions in the context
of environmental law. Some Indian lands are rich in mineral resources.' 4 With the current emphasis on the discovery and development
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a State, and (c)
all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976). Although the definition was a part of a criminal code,
the Court has extended the definition to civil judicial and regulatory jurisdiction.
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
6.31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
7 Compare Worcester, id., with United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621
(1881) ; compare McBratney, id., with Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
8 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
9 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
10 See generally R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 137-202 (discussion of the Court's confusion of the tribal sovereignty and state jurisdiction doctrines).
11 Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980)
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) ; Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
12 "For the past thirty years, however, [the courts] have confused the issues
so thoroughly that case outcomes and congressional declarations of policy bear
little relation to one another." R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 137.
13 See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,
25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1976) ; Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 14511543 (1976). See also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
143, 143 n.10 (1980).
14 Reservations contain deposits of coal, oil, gas, phosphate, uranium, and iron.
See FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, TASK
FORCE SEVEN:

RESERVATION AND RESOURCE

DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION

46-

47 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE SEVEN REPORT] ; Note, Balancing the
Interests in Taxation of Non-Indian Activities on Indian Lands, 64 IowA L. REV.
1459,1459 (1979).
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2567512
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of domestic energy sources, the potential for extensive mining exists on
some reservations.'" Moreover, the present congressional policy of
tribal self-determination encourages economic development and independence and, therefore, possibly industrial and resource development..
Consequently, Indian reservations may become sources of increasing
pollution. 16
Some states already have attempted to enforce their environmental
protection laws on Indian reservations, 17 and more states will attempt
15 "[R]ecent mineral discoveries and the increased prices of energy resources
have made many reservations viable locations for real economic development."
TASK FORCE SEVEN REPORT, supra note 14, at 132; see also id. at 146; CouNcIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS,

STATE ENVIRONMENTAL

ISSUE

SERIES:

INDIAN

RIGHTS

CLAIMS 26 (1977) [hereinafter cited as COUNCIL].
In the state of Washington, there have been two major mineral developments
within Indian reservations over the last five years. A uranium enrichment operation was developed on the Spokane Reservation and an open-pit molybdenum
mining operation is being developed on the Colville Reservation. If the mine is
fully developed, it would be the tenth largest open-pit mining operation in the
world. Non-Indians would operate the mine. Letter from Charles B. Roe, Jr.,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Olympia, Washington (Feb. 4, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Roe].
In Idaho, the Simplot Corporation and the FMC Corporation have phosphate
mines and plants located within the Fort Hall Reservation of the ShoshoneBannocks. Letter from Jack Hockberger, Deputy Attorney General, Natural Resources Division, Boise, Idaho (Feb. 5, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Hockberger].
16 For example, air emissions from phosphate plants on the Fort Hall Reservation drift downwind over Pocatello, Idaho. Hockberger, supra note 15. See Schaller, The Applicability of Environmental Statutes to Indian Lands, Am. INDIAN
J., Aug., 1976, at 15, 15.
17 See, e.g., Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 658
(9th Cir. 1975) (California wanted a state environmental impact report prepared) ; United States v. County of Humboldt, No. C-74-2526 RFP (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 22, 1977) (held that the California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1976), was not enforceable against the Hoopa
Valley Tribe, the Hoopa Valley Housing Authority, or non-Indian contractors
and employees) ; Norvell v. Sangre De Cristo Development Co., 372 F. Supp.
348, 352 (D.N.M. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 519 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1975)
(New Mexico sought to enforce its Water Quality Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7539-1 to 75-39-12 (1953), against non-Indian lessees) ; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 36-1865, 36-1901 (1974) (Arizona's legislature asserts that its air and water
pollution laws apply to tribal lands) ; COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 35 n.48 (the
North Dakota Attorney General's office has concluded that the state's Air Pollution Control Legislation, Water Pollution Control Legislation, Solid Waste Management Program, Pesticide Control, Strip-Mine Reclamation, and Water Appropriation laws apply to Indians and Indian lands) ; Comment, The Applicability
of the Federal Pollution Acts to Indian Reservations: A Case for Tribal SelfGovernment, 48 CoLo. L. REv. 63, 86 n.126 (1977) (New Mexico's Attorney General has concluded that the state's air pollution regulations apply to reservations) ;
Memorandum on State Jurisdiction Over Indian Reservations from Stephen C.
Pohl, Legal Intern, Mont. St. Dep't of Nat. Resources & Conservation to Donald
AND
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to do the same. In some situations, states clearly have a legitimate
8
interest in controlling pollution on Indian reservations.' Most types of
pollution, by nature, cannot be confined within the political boundaries
of a reservation.1 9 The spread of pollution from an on-reservation
source may be of considerable concern to a state. Furthermore, current
federal environmental protection programs strongly encourage state
participation, 20 and in the future, independent state and local environmental protection programs may be emphasized. 2 1 Hence, the extent
of state regulatory jurisdiction in Indian country is likely to be tested
22
in the context of environmental law.
Part I of this Comment will trace the development of state jurisdictional doctrine from the Worcester tribal sovereignty doctrine through
the Willams infringement test to the McClanahan preemption analysis.
Part II will then explore the recent cases involving state regulatory
jurisdiction. Based on those cases, this Comment will project what test
the Court is developing for state regulatory jurisdiction. Part III will
then apply the projected test to four hypothetical situations within an
D. Maclntyre, Chief Legal Counsel (Aug. 12, 1980) (concludes that the Montana

Major Facility Siting Act,

MONT. REV. CODES ANN.

§§ 75-20-101 to 75-20-1105

(1978), applies to reservations). See also note 22 infra.
18 See text accompanying notes 146-51 infra.
19 See Will, Indian Lands Environment-Who Should Protect It, 18 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 465, 471 (1978).
20 See, e.g., Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976)
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West 1980). See COUNCIL, supra note
15, at 24; Brecher, Federal Regulatory Statutes and Indian Self-Determination:
Some Problems and Some Proposed Legislative Solutions, 19 ARIZ. L. REv. 285,
309-10 (1978) ; Will, supra note 19, at 474.
21 Of the Clean Air Act's 133 existing sections, the Reagan administration
proposes to repeal 70 and relax 58. Hayes, Coalition to Fight Pollution, Safety
Cuts, The Oregonian, Oct. 2, 1981, § C, at 1, col. 1. If federal involvement in
environmental protection lessens, state environmental programs will increase in
importance.
22 "Extensive state involvement in state and federally initiated environmental

programs has increased the incidence of conflicting state and tribal claims to
jurisdiction." COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 12. Also, the recognition of the importance of natural resources on tribal lands increases the possibility of state and
tribal jurisdictional conflicts. Note, State Jurisdiction on Indian Reservations,

Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 13

LAND AND WATER

L.

REV.

1035, 1046 (1978). For example, Washington's Office of the Attorney General has
stated that state pollution control laws, implemented consistently with federal
pollution laws, apply to mineral developments within reservations. A large openpit molybdenum mine is being developed on the Colville Reservation in Washington. The Tribe contends that state water laws and state pollution control laws are
not applicable to the mine. Roe, supra note 15. Idaho's Attorney General believes
that the phosphate mines and plants on the Fort Hall Reservation may create a
state regulatory jurisdiction problem. There may also be jurisdictional problems
over development on the Duck Valley Reservation in Southwest Idaho and Northern Nevada. Hockberger, supra note 15.

State Regulatory Jurisdictionin Indian Country

565

environmental regulation context. The Comment finally will examine
the implications of the test in the environmental context and will suggest
how tribes may avoid increased state incursions.
I
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STATE REGULATORY
JURISDICTION DOCTRINES

A. Worcester v. Georgia: TribalSovereignty
Although Worcester v. Georgia2 3 involved state criminal jurisdiction,
its doctrines, like those of many other criminal and civil jurisdiction
cases, were subsequently applied in the context of state regulatory
jurisdiction.2 4 In Worcester, the defendants were non-Indians who
resided within the reservation boundaries. The state charged that the
defendants had violated a state criminal statute directed at on-reservation activities. The issue was whether the state criminal statute was
25
repugnant to the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall established that the
Indian tribes, although subject to federal authority, were sovereigns
independent of the states.26 The United States, in its treaties with the
27
Indian tribes, sought the preservation of the Indian sovereign nations.
Because the federal treaties were the supreme law of the land, state laws
could have no effect within Indian reservations. 28 In establishing the
basic doctrine of tribal sovereignty, Worcester effectively built a wail
around Indian reservations, apparently impenetrable by state laws.
The Worcester wall stood undisturbed for nearly fifty years. 29 In
1881, the Court held, in United States v. McBratney,3 0 that the state
had criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant for the murder
3
of another non-Indian on the reservation. 1
2331 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
24 See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) ; The Kansas Indians, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866) (state could not tax lands belonging to an Indian
tribe).
25 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 537-42.

26 Id. at 552, 559-61.
27 Id. at 557.
2S Id. at 559-61.
29 See note 24 supra. See generally R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 2,

at 31-134 (the historical development of the tribal sovereignty doctrine).

30 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
31 See generally P. MAXFIELD, M. DIETRICH & F. TRELEASE, supra note 2, at

81-82 (criticism of the McBratney modification of Worcester); Dolan, State
Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Mineral Activities on Indian Reservations, 21
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 475, 486-87 (emphasizes the unusual facts of McBratney; the creation of the territory or state preceded the creation of the reser-

vation).
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After McBratney, the Court upheld many further state incursions
into tribal sovereignty. 32 Unfortunately, the Court decided these subsequent cases without any clear doctrinal development. Hence, the once
33
clear Worcester doctrine of tribal sovereignty was left in disarray.
B. Williams v. Lee: The Infringement Test

The Court decided the landmark case of Williams v. Lee34 in 1959,
127 years after Worcester. In Williams, a non-Indian plaintiff brought
a civil action against an Indian defendant to collect for goods sold on
the reservation. The Court noted that the basic policy of Worcester
remained, although modified. 35 Synthesizing the post-Worcester cases,
the Court articulated a test for state jurisdiction on a reservation-the
now famous Williams infringement test: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."'3 6 Moreover, the Court recognized that, in
any event, if only Indians are involved in an on-reservation dispute,
37
the states have no jurisdictional power to intercede.
In Williams, the Court concluded that state civil jurisdiction would
32See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949) (the
Court upheld a state tax on the activities of non-Indian mineral lessees) ; Thomas
v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) (the Court allowed a state to impose a tax on the
cattle (as property) of non-Indian lessees who grazed the cattle on the leased
reservation lands) ; Utah & Northern Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) (the
Court upheld a state tax on non-Indian fee land located within a reservation).
"As the tribes moved from an isolated reservation existence and became involved in exchanges with surrounding state communities, a large area of uncertainty evolved. Increased interaction between tribes and state citizens raised taxation issues that had not been specifically addressed by Congress." Note, supra note
5, at 319.
33 Post-Worcester cases developed "a hodgepodge of law that offers little
guidance for either the state or the tribe." Note, supra note 5, at 319; see Barsh,
Issues in Federal,State and Tribal Taxation of Reservation Wealth: A Survey
and Economic Critique, 54 WASH. L. REV. 531, 533 (1979). See generally Dolan,
supra note 31, at 486-92. For example, the Court, ignoring the Worcester tribal
sovereignty doctrine, held that a state could not tax a non-Indian mineral lessee
because of the federal instrumentality doctrine. Under that doctrine, which is
closely related to the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities, the lessee was
considered to be an instrumentality or agent of the federal government. The state
tax, therefore, would interfere with the functioning of the federal government.
Choctow & Gulf R.R. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914), overruled, Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365 (1949). When the Court then rejected the federal instrumentality doctrine in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas
Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949), it was able to uphold a state tax on the activities of
non-Indian mineral lessees. Id.
34358 U.S. 217 (1959).
35 Id. at 219.
36 Id. at 220.
3
T Id.
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"no doubt" infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. 8
In support of its conclusion, the Court offered only one unexplained
assertion: state jurisdiction would undermine the tribal court's authority over reservation affairs.8 9 The poorly supported conclusion may
have indicated that any infringement, however minor, on a tribal government's domain would bar state jurisdiction. The Court also failed
to state whether or not any "governing Acts of Congress" existed.
Williams not only reaffirmed Worcester'sbasic policy of tribal sover-

eignty in Indian country, but it also attempted to enunciate a clear test
for state jurisdiction. The test, in light of the continuing vitality of
Worcester, recognized a presumption that the states lack jurisdiction
in Indian country; a state law would not apply unless the state proved
40
the law would not infringe on tribal self-government.
Williams, however, left two important questions unanswered. First,
the Court did not adequately define "infringement," and to this day,
the Court has not resolved this question satisfactorily. 4 Second, the
Court did not discuss what congressional actions would constitute a
"governing Act of Congress." The Court subsequently has answered,
though not always explicitly, this second question. One "governing Act
of Congress" is the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme that leaves
38

Id. at 223.

Id.
See Dolan, supra note 31, at 492-95. But see text accompanying notes 108-09
infra (the presumption arguably has shifted in favor of state jurisdiction).
41 Perhaps because of this ambiguity, the Court confused the infringement test
just three years after Williams. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60
(1962), involved the state regulation of fishing by nonreservation Indians. The
Court, going beyond the facts in Kake, misread the Williams test and overbroadly
restated it: "[E]ven on reservations state laws may be applied to Indians unless
such application would interfere with reservation self-government or impair a
right granted or reserved by federal law." Id. at 75. Hence, Kake extended the
infringement test to situations involving only Indians on a reservation, while
Williams had said that states did not have jurisdiction over disputes between
Indians on the reservation. More significantly, the Court in Kake disregarded
Worcester's basic policy of tribal sovereignty in Indian country and instead created
a presumption of state jurisdiction. See Dolan, supra note 31, at 494-95.
In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (companion case to
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)), New Mexico
wanted to impose a gross receipts and use tax on a tribally operated off-reservation ski resort. In upholding the state tax, the Court repeated the infringement
test as stated in Kake. Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148.
Both Kake and Mescalero arguably are consistent with Williams if limited to
their facts; both involved state jurisdiction in an off-reservation context, while
Williams involved on-reservation jurisdiction. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 176
n.15. See generally Dolan, supra note 31, at 494-95. Nevertheless, both cases not
only failed to clarify what constituted an "infringement" but also added to the
obscurity of the infringement test by misstating it. See Dolan, supra note 31, at
494-95.
39

40
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no room for a state to impose additional burdens upon licensed nonIndians who trade with Indians on a reservation.4 2 The Court also has
held that Public Law 28043 is a "governing Act of Congress";44 if a
state has not complied with the Act's procedures, the state cannot have
46
45
that the Act authorizes.
the criminal and civil judicial jurisdiction
C. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission:
The Preemption Analysis
In McClanahanv. Arizona State Tax Commission,4 7 decided in 1973,
the state sought to impose an income tax on an Indian who derived her
income from on-reservation sources. The Court held that the treaty
that recognized the reservation preempted the extension of state law,
including the state income tax, to Indians on the reservation. The treaty,
a general federal action establishing Indian country, was a "governing
Act of Congress"; therefore, the Court did not need to analyze possible
infringements on tribal self-government.
McClanahanfurther clarified Williams by delineating another "governing Act of Congress. ' 48 At the same time, McClanahan was a new
landmark, a step beyond Williams. After discussing the Worcester
tribal sovereignty doctrine 49 and quoting the Williams infringement
test, -0 the Court stated: "Finally, the trend has been away from the idea
42 Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
The comprehensive federal regulations apparently were a "governing Act of
Congress," although the Court did not identify the regulations as such. The
Court mentioned Williams only in a footnote. Id. at 687 n.3.
43 Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (1976)).
44 Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971). The Court
clearly identified a "governing Act of Congress." Kennerly's facts were similiar
to the facts in Williams; a non-Indian brought an action against an Indian defendant to recover a debt for an on-reservation transaction. Unlike Williams, the
tribe in Kennerly had attempted to unilaterally transfer concurrent jurisdiction to
the state. The tribe's action, however, was not in accordance with Public Law
280. See note 43 supra. The Court never discussed any infringement of tribal
self-government because of the "governing Act of Congress."
45 In dicta, the Supreme Court has indicated that Public Law 280 did not
transfer regulatory jurisdiction to the designated states. Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U.S. 373 (1976) ; see Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310
(5th Cir. 1981) ; Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th
Cir. 1975).
46 Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. at 426-27. Public Law 280
was not a "governing Act of Congress" in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959),
because the amended complaint was filed on November 25, 1952, Record at 1, id.,
while Public Law 280 was not passed until 1953. See note 43 supra.
47 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
2
48 See id. at 179-80, 180 n. 1; notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
49 411 U.S. at 168-71.
50
Id. at 171-72.
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of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward
reliance on federal preemption." 51
McClanahande-emphasized the tribal sovereignty doctrine of Worcester, yet indicated that the doctrine remained important as a "backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be
read."' 52 Most significantly, McClanahanemphasized the importance of
a federal preemption analysis when determining state jurisdiction. 53 In
any preemption analysis, congressional intent determines whether state
laws have been preempted or precluded. McClanahan,however, recognized the difference between ordinary preemption and Indian preemption. In ordinary preemption, if Congress does not expressly preempt
the state law, the presumption is that the state has jurisdiction. In
Indian preemption, any general federal action that establishes Indian
country may be a source of preemption and creates a strong presump54
tion against state jurisdiction.
McClanahanalso gave new vitality to Williams. The Court reasserted
that in Indian country, state laws generally do not apply to Indians
absent congressional consent. The question of infringement arises only
when a state has a legitimate interest in regulating non-Indians in
Indian country. 55
Nevertheless, McClanahanplanted seeds that have grown into greater
state incursions on tribal sovereignty. McClanahan was the first case
to suggest that the determination of state jurisdiction in Indian country
may require the consideration of legitimate state interests when nonIndians are involved.5 6 Furthermore, the Court's de-emphasis of the
51 Id. at 172.
53

Id.
See id.; Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. at 376 n.2.

54

See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980)

52

D. GETCHES,

D.

ROSENFELT &

C.

WILKINSON,

FEDERAL

INDIAN

LAW

295-99

(1979).
The creation of Indian country by executive order, instead of congressional
action, is a general federal action. Because Congress has plenary power over
Indian affairs, an executive order reservation exists only through congressional
acquiescence. Consequently, even for executive order reservations, congressional
intent is determinative, but it can be determined only through an examination of
the executive order. See generally id. at 296. See also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894, 899 n.1 (1982).
55 411 U.S. at 170-71, 179-80. McClanahan also established that state interference with the rights of an individual Indian is an infringement of tribal selfgovernment. Id. at 181.
56 "[N]otions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to take account of the
State's legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non-Indians." Id. at 171.
"In [situations involving non-Indians], both the tribe and the State could fairly
claim an interest in asserting their respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was
designed to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could protect its
interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be affected." Id. at
179; see Dolan, supra note 31, at 501-02.

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Volume 61, 1982]

tribal sovereignty doctrine opened the reservations to even greater
extensions of state jurisdiction.
II
RECENT DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS AND DIRECTIONS

A. Recent Cases and the Developing Doctrines
The cases after McClanahan have left the rapidly evolving law on
state regulatory jurisdiction in disarray. In a series of decisions, the
Court has further de-emphasized tribal sovereignty while emphasizing
state interests. The Supreme Court, in a 1976 decision, Moe v. Con57
federated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of FlatheadIndianReservation,
held that a state can impose a sales tax on non-Indians who purchase
cigarettes from on-reservation Indian smoke shops. Furthermore, the
state can require the Indian seller to collect the sales tax. The Court
reasoned that the collection requirement was only a "minimal burden"
on the Indian seller, yet the requirement aided the state's collection of
a tax validly imposed on non-Indians. This "minimal burden" did not
58
frustrate tribal self-government.
Moe is significant because the Court seized the "legitimate state
interest" dictum of McClanahan and injected it into the Williams infringement test.5 9 State regulatory jurisdiction was not solely a question
of infringement on tribal self-government, rather it was a question that
involved a balance of legitimate tribal and state interests. McClanahan
had indicated that the infringement test did not apply to on-reservation
Indians ; a state could not regulate on-reservation Indians without congressional consent. 60 Nevertheless, by finding legitimate state interests,
Moe allowed the state to regulate on-reservation Indian sellers indirectly, through a tax collection requirement, despite the absence of
congressional consent.
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville,61 decided in 1980,
a state again sought to tax on-reservation purchases of cigarettes by
nonmembers. 62 In Colville, however, the tribes themselves, not just
individual tribal members, were deeply involved in the cigarette sales.
The tribes were wholesalers and retailers, and the tribes imposed their
own taxes on the sales. Furthermore, the federal government had approved the tribal taxes. 3 If the case had been resolved as simply a
5T 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
58 Id. at 482-83.

59 Id.
60 See
61447
62 See
63 447

note
U.S.
note
U.S.

55 and accompanying text supra.
134 (1980).
73 infra.
at 172 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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question of infringement, the state taxes probably would have been
invalidated. But despite congressional support of tribal self-determination and self-government,64 the Court held that federal and tribal interests must be accommodated with legitimate state interests.65 Emphasizing that the primary tribal interest involved was merely the marketing of a state tax exemption to tribal nonmembers, 66 the Court upheld
the state taxes on nonmembers. Moreover, the Court apparently ap67
plied a presumption of state jurisdiction.
Colville severely undercut the McClanahan emphasis on federal Indian preemption. No longer must state regulatory jurisdiction be consistent with McClanahan'sbasic notions of Indian preemption: federal
power and tribal self-government. 68 The Colville Court instead articulated a balance of interests test-federal and tribal interests, on the one
hand, and state interests, on the other hand.6 9
The Colville balancing test reduces the Worcester doctrine of tribal
sovereignty to shambles. Under the Williams infringement test, Wor70
cester lived in the presumption that the state lacked jurisdiction.
Under McClanahan, Worcester lived because the tradition of tribal
sovereignty remained an important backdrop when reading federal
treaties and statutes. 71 But under Colville, the Worcester doctrine is
nearly eliminated. Deep infringements on tribal sovereignty might be
upheld if compelling state interests exist.
Agreeing with Moe, the Colville Court asserted that a state can impose "at least" minimal burdens on the Indians.7 2 Then, by applying the
64

See note 13 supra.
U.S. at 156. Contra id. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting)

65 447

(congressional intent alone should determine state jurisdiction; the Court should
not attempt to accommodate or balance legitimate interests).
66
Id. at 155.
67 The Tribes, and not the State as the District Court supposed, bear the
burden of showing that the recordkeeping requirements which they
are challenging are invalid. The District Court made the factual finding,
which we accept, that there was no evidence of record on this question.
Applying the correct burden of proof to the District Court's finding, we
hold that the Tribes have failed to demonstrate that the State's recordkeeping requirements for exempt sales are not reasonably necessary as
a means of preventing fraudulent transactions.
Id. at 160. Contra id. at 174 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (the state
should show the necessity or utility of state jurisdiction).
Arguably, the majority presumed the validity of the recordkeeping requirements
only because they were incidental to a validly imposed state tax. Perhaps, if a
state regulation were viewed in isolation, the Court would presume that the state
lacked jurisdiction to impose the regulation.
68 See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
69 447 U.S. at 156, 161.
70 See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
71 See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
72 447 U.S. at 151, 159.
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balance of interests test apparently in light of a presumption of state
jurisdiction, the Court not only upheld the state sales tax on all tribal
nonmembers,7 but more significantly, going far beyond loe's minimal
burdens, the Court also upheld three exercises of state regulatory jurisdiction over the tribes: (1) a requirement that the tribes, not merely
individual Indians, collect the sales tax for the state; (2) recordkeeping
requirements, even for nontaxable sales to tribal members; and (3) the

state's seizure of tribal cigarette shipments before they reached the
reservation to ensure tax payments, even though the state tax was not
4
due on cigarettes still in transit.1
Colville can be read in two ways. First, Colville may be read narrowly to hold that the infringement test has evolved into a balance of
interests test. 75 Under this reading, a court will use the Colville balanc-

ing test only when the court must determine whether a state law infringes on tribal sovereignty, that is, in the absence of a governing act
of Congress. 7 6 Second, Colville may be read broadly to hold that a
court should balance federal, tribal, and state interests whenever a state
seeks to regulate in Indian country, even if a governing act of Congress
exists and no question of infringement is reached. Subsequent cases,
though unclear and inconclusive, indicate that the Supreme Court will
give Colville the broader interpretation.
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,77 decided in 1980, a
tribal timber enterprise contracted with non-Indian corporations to
perform logging operations on the reservation. The state sought to
impose its motor carrier license and use fuel taxes on the non-Indian
corporations. The Court stated that Congress's broad power to reg-ulate tribal affairs, together with the tribe's semi-independent position,
gave rise to "two independent but related barriers" to state regulatory
power: federal preemption and the infringement of tribal self-government.7

s

The two are related because self-government not only depends

ultimately on congressional power but also provides a backdrop for the

79
interpretation of federal treaties and statutes.
Focusing on the preemption barrier, the Court noted that, under
Indian preemption law, an express congressional statement is not re-

73 Id. at 159. The Court distinguished tribal members from Indians on the
reservation who were not tribal members. The state could tax all nonmembers,
whether Indian or non-Indian. Id. at 160-61.
74 Id. at 159-62.
75 See, e.g., 447 U.S. at 156-57, 161 ; accord Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New
Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 733 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 101 S. Ct.
1752 (1981).
76 See text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.
77 448 U.S. 136 (1980).

78

Id. at 142.

79

Id. at 143.
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quired to preempt state jurisdiction.80 But in lamentable dicta, the
Court added: "At the same time any applicable regulatory interest of
the State must be given weight,"81 even when the state seeks to regulate
On-reservation tribal members. 8 2 Thus, the Court seemingly grafted
the legitimate state interest factor onto the preemption barrier just as
the Moe and Colville Courts had grafted it onto the infringement
barrier.
Turning to the facts at issue, the White Mountain Court held that
comprehensive federal regulation of Indian timber harvesting left no
room for state regulation; the state taxes would obstruct federal policy
and were therefore preempted.13 Although previously accepted notions
of Indian preemption were sufficient to resolve the case, the Court unnecessarily returned to its legitimate state interest reasoning8 4 and
added in dictum: "And equally important, [the state has] been unable
to identify any regulatory function or service performed by the State
that would justify the assessment of taxes for activities on Bureau [of
Indian Affairs] and tribal roads within the reservation."8 5 In other
words, even if a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme strongly
evidences implied congressional intent to preempt state law, sufficient
state interests might nevertheless justify state jurisdiction. Previous
cases had balanced federal, tribal, and state interests only if there was
a question of infringement, not if there was a governing act of Congress.8 6 Thus, by balancing interests even in the presence of a governing act of Congress, White Mountain further eviscerated the preemption analysis of McClanahan.
Although White Mountain indicates that the Court will read Colville
broadly, the Court surprisingly failed even to mention legitimate state
interests in another 1980 case. In Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona
State Tax Commission,87 the state sought to tax an on-reservation sale
of farm machinery by a non-Indian corporation to a tribe despite a
80 Id.at 144.
81 Id.
82 "When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law
is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal
and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest."

Id.
83
84

Id. at 145-49.
See notes 81-82 and accompanying text supra.

85 448 U.S. at 148-49. The Court subsequently stated: "[Tihis is not a case
in which the State seeks to assess taxes in return for governmental functions it
performs for those on whom the taxes fall. Nor have respondents been able to
identify a legitimate regulatory interest served by the taxes they seek to impose."
Id. at 150.
86 See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra; see, e.g., Colville, 447 U.S.
134; Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Indian Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
87 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
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comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for Indian trading. Apparently, the Court found the previous case of Warren TradingPost Co. v.
Arizona Tax Commission,s s although factually distinguishable on two
points, to be controlling.8 9 In striking down the state tax, the Central
Machinery Court may have failed to mention legitimate state interests
because the Court's reliance on Warren Trading Post obviated the need
for further analysis.
In Montana v. United States,90 decided in 1981, the Court did not
specifically address the question of state jurisdiction. The issue was
whether the tribe had the power to regulate hunting and fishing by
non-Indians on non-Indian fee land located within the reservation
boundaries. 9 ' Holding that the tribe lacked that power, the Court stated
that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent
with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without
express congressional delegation." 9 2 If maintained, the Montana Court's
restrictive view of tribal sovereignty may affect state jurisdiction cases,
particularly when a court balances a tribe's interest in self-government
against a state's legitimate interests. Montana's vitality, however, is
questionable. In a 1982 case, Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe,93 the
Court ignored Montana and upheld the tribe's power to impose a sever94
ance tax on minerals extracted by non-Indian lessees.
B. 4 Projectionof Developing Doctrinefor State
Regulatory Jurisdiction: A Threefold Test
Since Williams and McClanahan, state regulatory jurisdiction doctrine has evolved considerably and is still evolving. The Court, however,
88 380 U.S. 685 (1965) ;see note 42 and accompanying text supra.
89 There are only two distinctions between Warren Trading Post . . .
and the present case: appellant is not a licensed Indian trader, and it
does not have a permanent place of business on the reservation. The
Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that these distinctions indicated
that federal law did not bar imposing the transaction privilege tax on
appellant. We disagree.
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 164 (1980)
(footnote omitted).
90 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
91 Id. at 557.
92 Id. at 564. This language apparently reinforces the presumption of state
jurisdiction.
93 102 S. Ct.894 (1982).
94 But cf. id. at 919 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the dissent relied extensively on
Montana in reasoning against tribal power to impose the severance tax on nonIndian lessees). Lower court cases have read Montana narrowly or have ignored
it. See, e.g., Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1981)
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
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has not clearly articulated this development. Other courts and interested
parties are faced with a confusing mass of diverse decisions. The Court
needs to enunciate a new test to clarify its inconclusive recent cases.
Based primarily on the trends of those recent cases, this section will
project how the Supreme Court might enunciate such a new jurisdictional test.
The mode of analysis of the new test is still federal preemption.9 5
Despite the White Mountain dichotomy of the preemption analysis and
the infringement analysis,9 6 a fundamental issue in the determination
of state jurisdiction is always whether the state law would conflict or
interfere with federal policies or purposes. Although the infringement
test is seldom identified as a form of preemption, the first step in the
infringement analysis is to determine whether a federal action has
created Indian country. This first step is often unmentioned because
cases rarely arise where there has not been a federal action creating
Indian country ;97 if no such federal action occurred, then no infringement controversy could arise because no tribal government exists. If a
federal action created Indian country, then a state law that infringes
on tribal self-government interferes with federal policy and may therefore be preempted. 98
The Williams infringement test and the McClanahan preemption
analysis still have vitality,99 but the Court has skewed its analysis to
favor increased state power when faced with difficult regulatory jurisdiction cases. 10° Those cases reveal a developing threefold test for state
regulatory jurisdiction: first, what, if any, sources of potential preemption exist; second, what is the maximum possible extent of preemption;
and finally, if the state law is not explicitly preempted but could be
implicitly preempted, on balance, do state interests outweigh federal
and tribal interests and thus justify state regulatory jurisdiction.
The first question in the projected threefold test is what, if any,
sources of potential preemption exist. Three types of sources are pos95 See notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra. See also White Mountain,
448 U.S. at 145; Colville, 447 U.S. at 167 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) ; id. at 176-77 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting).
96 See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
97

See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 n.8.

98 See D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, supra note 54, at 296-97.
The Court in White Mountain admits that the "right of tribal self-government
is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of Congress." 448 U.S.
at 143. The Court also recognizes the importance of a federal action that creates
Indian country by noting the "significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty." Id. at 151.
99 See text accompanying notes 57-94 supra.
100 See, e.g., Colville, 447 U.S. 134; Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes of Flathead Indian Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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sible: (1) jurisdictional statutes such as Public Law 280 ;101 (2) comprehensive federal regulatory schemes such as the Indian trading
laws;102 and (3) general federal actions, such as treaties, creating
10 3
Indian country.
If a source of potential preemption does exist, then the second question is what is the maximum possible extent of preemption. If the source
of potential preemption is a jurisdictional statute and it has not been
complied with, then all state laws, to which the statute applies, may be
preempted.1 0 4 For example, Public Law 280, which applies only to
state criminal and civil jurisdiction, can operate to preempt state criminal and civil laws but not state regulatory laws. 10 5 If the source of
potential preemption is a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme,
then all state laws that regulate the same field of activity may be preempted. 10 6 If the source of potential preemption is merely a general
federal action, then for a particular state law to be preemptible, the
0 T
tribe must show that the state law infringes on tribal self-government.
In light of Colville and Montana, a presumption of state jurisdiction
arguably would exist.' 08
Even if any of the above potential sources could preempt state law,
absent express congressional intent to preempt, the state still might
assert a legitimate state interest. Hence, the third question is whether,
on balance, state interests outweigh federal and tribal interests and thus
justify state regulatory jurisdiction. If a state demonstrates any legitimate interest in regulation, then, once again, a presumption of state
jurisdiction arguably would exist.' 0 9
101 See, e.g., Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971)
notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra. Public Law 280 does not provide for
the transfer of regulatory jurisdiction. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373
(1976).
102

See, e.g., Central Machinery, 448 U.S. 160; White Mountain, 448 U.S. 136

(1980) ; Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 684 (1965)
text accompanying note 42 supra.
103 See, e.g., McClanahan,411 U.S. 164; text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
See, e.g., Kennerly, 400 U.S. 423.
105 See notes 44-45 supra.
106 See note 102 supra.
104

107

See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Even in a case involving

on-reservation Indians, the tribe would have to show infringement, but in such a

case, the burden of proof would be met easily. See White Mountain, 448 U.S. at
144.
108 See notes 67 & 93 supra.
109 In White Mountain, the Court asserts that the state has "been unable to
identify any regulatory function or service" that would justify state jurisdiction.
448 U.S. at 148-49 (emphasis added). The Court also asserts that the state has
been unable "to identify a legitimate regulatory interest." Id. at 150 (emphasis
added). Arguably, if the state shows any legitimate interest, then the burden falls
onto the tribe to show that the tribal and federal interests outweigh the state
interests. See notes 67 & 93 and accompanying text supra.
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The Court already has applied the balancing test in upholding state
jurisdiction in cases where the only source of potential preemption was
a general federal action." 0 Although the Court has not yet used the
balancing test to uphold state jurisdiction after first finding that a comprehensive federal scheme applied, White Mountain indicates that a
state could justify its jurisdiction in such a case."' An opportunity for
the Court to discuss the balancing test in a case that involves a jurisdictional statute has not yet arisen, but the trend of the cases strongly suggests that the Court would apply the balancing test.
Whether the source of potential preemption is a general federal
action, a comprehensive federal scheme, or a jurisdictional statute,
1 2
congressional intent to preempt state law is nearly always implicit. '
The balancing test allows a state to rebut the inference of congressional
intent. In other words, when determining whether Congress intended
to preempt state law, the Court will consider legitimate state interests
if it deems congressional intent unclear. More than likely, the Court
will not apply the balancing test only if Congress has expressly stated
its intent to preempt state law.
Although the White Mountain Court acknowledged the distinction
between ordinary preemption and Indian preemption,"' that Court's
application of the Indian preemption doctrine narrowed the distinction.
In the past, Indian preemption law had operated with a strong presumption against state jurisdiction." 4 This strong presumption no longer
exists; instead, a presumption favoring state jurisdiction arguably now
exists absent express congressional intent to preempt in both ordinary
and Indian preemption." 5 Hence, the vitality of the Worcester tribal
sovereignty doctrine is negligible. Even though the tradition of tribal
sovereignty still provides a backdrop for the interpretation of ambiguous
congressional actions, 116 unless congressional preemptive intent is express, the balancing test and the arguable presumption of state jurisdiction may permit deep state incursions into tribal sovereignty. Thus,
the Court's movement toward the threefold test for state regulatory
110 See, e.g., Colville, 447 U.S. 134; Moe, 425 U.S. 463.
11 See notes 83-86 and accompanying text supra. The Court in Central Machinery, however, did not use a balancing test after concluding that there was a
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme. While dissenters in Central Machinery
suggested that a balancing test was appropriate, 448 U.S. at 170 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting), the majority disagreed, not because it rejected the balancing test but
because it found that Warren Trading Post was controlling, and no further
analysis was needed. See notes 87-89 and accompanying text supra.
112 See D. GETCHS, D. ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, supra note 54, at 296.
113 See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
114 See, e.g., McClanahan,411 U.S. 164.
115 See note 109 supra.
116 See White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 143; text accompanying note 52 supra.
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jurisdiction apparently contravenes professed congressional support of
tribal self-determination and self-government. 1 17 Furthermore, the test
introduces great uncertainty into state regulatory jurisdiction disputes.
When a court determines congressional intent by balancing state interests against federal and tribal interests, the court can exercise great
discretion. Consequently, future cases are likely to be a confusing and
often inconsistent mass of ad hoc decisions.' 1 8
III
THE THREEFOLD TEST IN THE CONTEXT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW

As previously discussed, state regulatory jurisdiction is likely to be
tested in the field of environmental law. Possible mineral and industrial
development in Indian country make reservations potential sources of
increased pollution. At the same time, state interest and involvement in
environmental regulation probably will increase." 9 Therefore, this section will apply the projected threefold test for state regulatory jurisdiction in the context of environmental law.
Because state, federal, and tribal interests may vary with the circumstances, four specific situations will be examined: (1) non-Indians' 20
on fee land within a reservation; (2) non-Indian lessees within a reservation; (3) non-Indian contractors within a reservation; and (4) Indians within their own reservation. 12 1 For convenience, the first situation will be examined in depth, and then the three other situations will
be examined together, with an emphasis placed on their similarities and
distinctions.
117 See note 13 supra. Congressional support of tribal self-government may be
specious. In light of judicial developments, Congress's failure to expressly preempt
state law arguably is tantamount to approval of expansive state regulatory jurisdiction and contravenes professed congressional policy.
118 The Court already has reasoned that state interests should be considered in
the regulatory jurisdiction context. See notes 56-69 & 77-86 and accompanying
text supra. If legitimate state interests are to be a factor, then a balancing test may
be inevitable. If a balancing test is deemed necessary, then perhaps, the best context
for balancing is the theefold test with its underlying preemption analysis.
119 See notes 14-22 and accompanying text supra.
120 As used in these four situations, non-Indians will include all tribal nonmembers, whether Indian or non-Indian. See note 73 supra.
121 In the second, third, and fourth situations, assume that the land is Indian
owned trust land. See note 155 infra.
Tribal interest in self-government is least in the first situation, see text accompanying notes 152-54 infra, progressively increases in the second and third situations, and is the greatest in the fourth situation. Compare Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), ucth White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 144. Under the
Williams infringement test, state law would not apply in at least the second,
third, and fourth situations. See Dolan, supra note 31, at 528-33; Will, supra note
19, at 494-99; Comment, supra note 17, at 83.
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A. Non-Indians on Fee Land Within a Reservation

Assume that non-Indians own and operate a coal-fired power plant
on fee land within a reservation. 122 Further assume that the state attempts to enforce its pollution regulations on the plant and the tribe
challenges the state's regulatory jurisdiction. 123 Under these circumstances, a court would apply the threefold test.
Under the threefold test, the first question for the court is what, if
any, sources of potential preemption exist. Whenever a state seeks to
exercise jurisdiction in Indian country, the general federal action that
created Indian country is a source of potential preemption. 1 24 The possibility of preemption increases, however, if Congress has passed a
general jurisdictional statute, such as Public Law 280, or if a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme exists. At present, no general juris125
dictional statute provides for the transfer of regulatory jurisdiction.
Also, no comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for environmental
protection applies solely and specifically to Indian country. General
federal laws, however, apply to Indians, absent conflicting treaty provisions. 126 Therefore, many federal environmental statutes may apply to
12 7
Indians and Indian country.
Nevertheless, those federal environmental statutes probably are not
a source of potential preemption for state environmental laws in Indian
country. The Environmental Protection Agency has adopted the policy
that federal environmental statutes neither increase nor decrease state
jurisdiction in Indian country.1 2s Furthermore, the Court has held that
supra note 19, at 497.
The non-Indian owners and operators might also challenge the state's

122 See Will,
123

regulatory jurisdiction, especially if the state's pollution regulations would economically burden the operation.
124 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
125 See note 45 supra.
126 See

Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99

(1960) ; D. GETCHEs, D. ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, supra note 54, at 203.
General laws do apply to Indians unless a special Indian right is involved. Some courts have ignored the fact that no treaty or trust land
was involved in Tuscarora. Thus the trust relationship, and the canons
of construction which accompany it, were not called into play in Tuscarora.When a special right is involved, however, Indian law principles
dictate that the specific right will govern over general legislation.

Id.; see id. at 200-04; Brecher, supra note 20, at 292-95.
127 See, e.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972) (National Environmental Policy Act applies to Indian country). The Court's reasoning in
Dazis has been criticized. See Brecher, supra note 20, at 302-07.
See generally Schaller, supra note 16 (notes the mention of Indian tribes in
the various statutes that the Environmental Protection Agency enforces). See

also Nance v. Environmental Protection Agency, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981)
(tribe can redesignate air quality standards under Clean Air Act).
128 See P. MAXFIELD, M. DIETRICH & F. TRELEASE, supra note 2, at 76-80;
Will, supra note 19, at 477, 480, 482, 483-87.
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a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme left no room for state laws
only where the federal laws have applied specifically to Indians. 129 A
court readily may infer congressional intent to preempt where a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme is specific to Indians and Indian
country; a court is less likely to infer similar congressional intent from
a federal law of general applicability. Moreover, because most federal
environmental laws encourage active state participation in pollution
control,1 3 0 courts are unlikely to find congressional intent to preempt
state law. Even if the present federal environmental laws could be a
potential source of preemption in Indian country, a strong possibility
exists that the federal pollution controls will be severely curtailed in
the near future, and state pollution controls, consequently, will increase
in significance.13 1 Accordingly, in the situation of a non-Indian owned
and operated coal-fired power plant on fee land within a reservation,
probably the only source of potential preemption is the general federal
132
action that created Indian country.
Having determined the source of potential preemption, the second
question for the court is what is the maximum possible extent of preemption. Because the source of potential preemption is a general federal
action, to invalidate the state environmental laws, the tribe must show
that the laws infringe on tribal self-government." 3 In this situation of
a non-Indian on fee land, Montana's"4 holding, that a tribe lacked
power over the non-Indian on fee land 3 5 weakens the tribe's position.
Montana does suggest, however, that tribal sovereign power may extend
36
to non-Indian activities if the health or welfare of the tribe is affected."
129 See, e.g., Central Machinery, 448 U.S. 160; White Mountain, 448 U.S. 136;
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
130 See note 20 supra.
131 See note 21 supra.
132 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
133 See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
134450 U.S. 544 (1981).
135 See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
136 "A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe." 450 U.S. at 566; accord Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir. 1981). The Court recently has
held that a tribe has the inherent power to impose a severance tax on non-Indian
mineral lessees. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894 (1982).
If the tribe can and does regulate the non-Indian on fee land, the tribe can argue

persuasively that the state cannot regulate. Colville distinguishes taxes from
other regulations and implies that, for regulations other than taxes, tribes and
states cannot have concurrent jurisdiction. 447 U.S. at 158-59; see Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d at 730, zacated and remanded, 101 S. Ct.
1752 (1981). Colville distinguishes taxes, however, not because they are inherently

different from other regulations, but only because a sovereign's interest in tax
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Because pollution is transient in nature and pollution originating on
non-Indian fee land within the reservation is very likely to affect the
health and welfare of the tribe, tribal sovereign power may extend to
the non-Indian activities. Therefore, the tribe may be able to show that
state laws regulating this pollution are an infringement of tribal selfgovernment, with the consequent possibility of implied congressional
intent to preempt those state laws.
Even if a tribe were able to show infringement, under the third
prong of the threefold test, a court would balance the federal and tribal
interests against the state interests to determine if the state laws should
apply despite the infringement. 137 Unfortunately, the tribes and the
states are likely to have conflicting values as well as conflicting interests
in economic development and environmental protection. 138
The fundamental federal and tribal interest is the promotion of tribal
self-government, 139 which includes the tribal right to control the health
or welfare of its members 1 40 and the tribe's right to control its economic
development.' 4 1 Inherent in these rights is the tribe's freedom to control
the use of its land and other resources. 14 2 Generally, tribal interest in
self-government is strongest when a tribal resource is involved and
when the tribe itself is involved in the activity.

143

In the case of environ-

mental regulation, the significant tribal resources of land, air, and water
are involved. Tribes may become involved in the activity by enacting
their own environmental protection laws. 144 Federal involvement in the
revenue is not, alone, a sufficient interest to justify jurisdiction. See, e.g., White
Mo-untain, 448 U.S. 136. Taxes are just one type of regulation, the same method
of analysis may be used in all regulatory jurisdiction cases, including tax cases.
See id. at 141 ; Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. at 384, 384 n.10, 384--85 n.ll, 388,
390.
137 See text accompanying notes 109-10 supra.
138 See Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 664 (9th

Cir. 1975).
139 See Colville, 447 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
140 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 566.
141 See generally id.; Colville, 447 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting) ; TASK FORCE SEVEN REPORT, supra note 14, at 22.
142 See Comment, supra note 17, at 85.
"43 See Colville, 447 U.S. at 155-57. See also White Mountain, 448 U.S. 136;

Moe, 425 U.S. 463.
144 The Navajo Nation has enacted ordinances that establish a Navajo Tribal
Environmental Protection Commission with the purpose and authority to protect
and enhance the environment within the Navajo Nation. 2 N.T.C. §§ 3401-3407
(1977).
The Commission has been very active. It recently adopted a regulation
which established a tax on excess sulphur emissions from power plants
within the reservation. The Crow Tribe, by Resolution No. 76-22 B,
adopted a comprehensive Environmental Health and Sanitation Ordinance (Jan. 31, 1976). On June 6, 1977, the Secretary of the Interior
approved the environmental regulations of the Cheyenne River Sioux
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activity also strengthens the federal and tribal interests. 145
States have a strong interest in economic development within their
borders. State interests also include the protection of the health and
welfare both of non-Indians on the reservation and of citizens outside
the reservation. 146 Hence, state interests may be strong if the reservation is near an urban area.147 State interests also will vary with the
magnitude of the pollution.145 If transient pollution is not controlled
at its reservation source, state environmental programs could be frustrated 149 not only because pollution may spread beyond reservation
boundaries, but also because local governments would be discouraged
from enforcing state programs when nearby Indian reservations could
ignore the programs.15 0 Because of their interests in controlling both
economic development and the health and welfare of their citizens,
51
states have an interest in the control of land use and natural resources.1
Of the four situations described above,' 52 the tribal interest is the
least in the situation of non-Indians on fee land.15 3 Although the land is
Indian country, neither the tribe nor its members own the land. On the
other hand, the state interest is greatest here because the state is seeking
to regulate a non-Indian on non-Indian owned land. In light of the
Court's de-emphasis of tribal sovereignty, the arguable presumption of
state jurisdiction, and the Court's Montana decision, 154 the state environmental laws probably would be upheld.
Tribe enacted by the tribe to govern mineral development and oil and

gas leasing activities on tribal and allotted land within the reservation.
This was the first time a tribe's environmental regulations had been
accepted in place of the Department's general regulations.

Will, supra note 19, at 465 n.2. See Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes to Prohibit
Aerial Crop Spraying Within the Confines of a Reservation, 78 Interior Dec. 229
(1971) (Department of Interior opinion upheld the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of

the Fort Hall Reservation of Idaho in their regulation of crop spraying on the
reservation) ; Will, supra note 19, at 499-503.
145

See generally White Mountain, 448 U.S. 136.

146 See Comment, supra note 17, at 85-86.

147 See note 16 supra.
148 See Comment, supra note 17, at 85-86.
149 See Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co. 389 U.S. 1016, 1018-19
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; COUNCIL, sutpra note 15, at 4-5; Will, supra
note 19, at 471.
See also R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 152. "The ability of each
state to maintain environmental conditions . .. consistent with its public policy
declines in proportion to the number of persons within its territory that it cannot
fully control." Id.
150 See COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 4-5.
151 See id.; Dolan, supra note 31, at 475.
152 See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
153 Tribal interest would, of course, be less if the land were not within Indian
country. See note 5 supra.
154 Montana involved non-Indian owned land. See text accompanying notes 9092 supra.
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B. Three Other Situations
Now assume that the coal-fired power plant is located on Indian
owned trust land within the reservation. 155 Jurisdictional disputes may
arise whether non-Indian lessees, non-Indian contractors, or tribal
members operate the plant. In all three situations, the analysis begins
with what, if any, sources of preemption exist. The general federal
action that created Indian country is a source of potential preemption
in all the situations. 15 6 Moreover, if the plant were located at the mouth
of a coal mine on the reservation157 and non-Indian lessees operated the
mine, the comprehensive federal regulations that control pollution by
mineral lessees in Indian country 15 would be an additional source of
potential preemption. 159
The second question is what is the maximum possible extent of preemption. In the specific situation of mineral lessees, because of comprehensive federal regulation, all state laws concerning the environmental
protection of air, water, and land resources may be preempted. For all
the other situations, where the only source of potential preemption is a
general federal action, to invalidate the state environmental laws, the
tribe must show that the imposition of state environmental laws would
infringe on tribal self-government. 160
155 Whether the land is communally held by a tribe or is individually held by
Indian allottees, almost all Indian owned land is held in trust. The United States
holds the legal title, and the tribe or the individual allottees hold the beneficial
interest. W. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 231-34 (1981).
156 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
157 See Will, supra note 19, at 497.

15825 C.F.R. §§ 177.1, 177.108 (1980). See generally Mineral Leasing Act of
1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396-396g (1976). Before approving any type of lease, the Secretary of the Interior must be satisfied that adequate consideration has been given
to the relationship between the proposed use of the leased land and the uses of
neighboring lands and to the environmental effects of the proposed use. 25 U.S.C.

§ 415(a) (1976).
159 See Dolan, supra note 31, at 527.

A recent Ninth Circuit case involved the imposition of a state severance tax on
mineral development by non-Indian lessees. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana,

650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). Although an environmental law was not at issue,
the state tax still would affect the tribe's development of its natural resources.
The court remanded the case with the following instructions:

We find that the Tribe's complaint adequately states a claim that the
Montana taxes infringe on its right to govern itself. To support the
claim at trial, the Tribe must show that the taxes substantially affect its
ability to offer governmental services or its ability to regulate the

development of tribal resources, and that the balance of state and tribal
interests renders the state's assertion of taxing authority unreasonable.

Id. at 1117. See Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 507 F. Supp. 446 (D.
Mont. 1981) (held that state could tax oil and gas production of non-Indian
lessees).

160 See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
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In the three situations, the tribe probably could argue successfully
that state laws would infringe on tribal self-government at least minimally. Even where the tribe's interest is the least-in the case of nonIndian lessees-the tribe can argue persuasively that environmental
effects are frequently long-lasting. When the leased land reverts to the
tribe, the tribe will be saddled with the environmental effects of the
lessee's activities. Moreover, because of its transient nature, pollution
on leased land could affect the health and welfare of the tribe. Because
of these environmental effects, the tribe could argue convincingly that
state regulatory laws would infringe on tribal self-government.
Consequently, in all of the situations, state environmental laws arguably could be preempted. Nevertheless, even in the mineral lessee
situation, a court then, under the third prong of the threefold test,
would determine whether, on balance, state interests outweigh federal
and tribal interests and thus justify state regulatory jurisdiction despite
16
the potential preemption. '
In the non-Indian lessee's situation, where either the tribe or its
members own the land, tribal interest is greater than in the non-Indians
on fee land situation. Moreover, the federal government is involved because it approves all Indian leases.1 62 Strong state interests, however,
also exist. Non-Indians are directly involved in the use of the land, and,
as already discussed, on-reservation pollution has off-reservation impacts. This case is harder than the non-Indian on fee land case, but the
consistent trend of the cases in favor of state jurisdiction and the arguable presumption of state jurisdiction would probably cause a court to
uphold the validity of the state laws. In the specific situation of mineral
lessees, however, the extensive federal involvement in environmental
protection 6 3 may tip the balance again state jurisdiction.
In the situation of non-Indian contractors, tribal interest is much
greater than in the first two situations: non-Indians on fee land and
non-Indian lessees. The tribe is deeply involved in the activity that
produces pollution; the non-Indian contractors merely assist in the
tribal activity.164 Furthermore, the tribe owns the resources involved.
The state interest in regulation, meanwhile, is much less than in the
first two situations. Non-Indians are only peripherally involved in the
tribal activity. The state's only strong interest is to prevent the offreservation effects of on-reservation pollution. In this situation, the
state environmental laws probably would not be applicable.
Of all the situations, tribal interest is the greatest and state interest
161 See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
62

See25 U.S.C. §415(a) (1976).
See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., White Mountain, 448 U.S. 136; Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
O'Cheskey, 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1417 (1981).
1

163
164
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is the least when the source of pollution is an Indian owned and operated enterprise within the Indians' own reservation.' 65 State regulation
of on-reservation tribal members would interfere with the basic tribal
interest in self-government. Therefore, state environmental laws probably would not be applicable.1 66 Even in this situation, however, state
jurisdiction is possible. Before the Court decided Moe1 67 in 1976, the
state unquestionably could not have exercised jurisdiction. But in Moe
and again in Colville,"6 s the Court allowed the state to impose an affirmative duty on the on-reservation Indians to aid the state in the collection
of taxes. 1 69 In the area of environmental protection, the Court could
reason that the state interest in the protection of the public's health and
welfare is so great that state laws should apply.1 70 Moe and Colville,
however, may be distinguished from the environmental situation involving on-reservation Indians. In both Moe and Colville, the states
were directly regulating only non-Indians; the states could force the
Indians merely to help regulate the non-Indians. In the environmental
71
context, the state would be regulating the Indians directly.'
C. Implications of the Threefold
Test in EnvironmentalLaw
The application of the threefold test does not yield categorical results
in any of the four hypothetical situations, and in an actual case, the
unique facts may be determinative. Nonetheless, in the context of environmental law, states undoubtedly could exploit the threefold test to
validate increased state regulatory jurisdiction in Indian country.
165

See note 82 supra.

166

Some authors, however, have discussed the possibility that the statutes that

the Environmental Protection Agency enforces delegate regulatory authority over
Indian country to the states. See COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 25; Schaller, supra

note 16, at 16; Will, supra note 19, at 474-76. The generally accepted view, however, is that the EPA statutes do not affect state regulatory jurisdiction. See note
128 and accompanying text supra.
167 425 U.S. 463.
168 447 U.S. 134,
169 See text accompanying notes 57-58 & 72-74 supra.
170 See generally State v. Red Lake DFL Comm., 303 N.W.2d 54 (Minn.
1981). A political committee, composed entirely of reservation Indians, was held
subject to state regulation because its activities led to dissemination of information
outside the reservation. This fact situation could be analogized to the pollution
situation. In Red Lake, however, the Indians, though performing all activities
solely on the reservation, intended the information to be conveyed off the reservation. In the pollution situation, although the pollution may spread off the reservation, the Indians certainly do not intend it to do so.
171 If the Court were to uphold a state's power to apply its environmental laws
to non-Indians in Indian country, the state would have a strong argument, based
on Moe and Colville, that the tribe would have to aid the state's enforcement
activities.
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Precedents set in environmental disputes in turn would forebode other
significant state incursions into tribal sovereignty. Furthermore, the
uncertainty of case-by-case adjudications probably would increase
checkerboard jurisdiction 7 2 in Indian country. Checkerboard jurisdiction is unworkable in the context of environmental protection because
of the transient nature of pollution. 1 73 Moreover, checkerboard jurisdiction creates animosity between Indians and non-Indians, especially
if economic advantages would result from different regulatory controls. 174 Both on-reservation and off-reservation development, by In-

dians and non-Indians, could proceed more smoothly if all parties knew
what law was applicable. 175 Only express congressional statements
could clarify the jurisdictional morass,176 yet, in the past, Congress has
allowed the Court broad discretion in the determination of state regulatory jurisdiction.

1 77

That the Court has not yet clearly enunciated the threefold test may
encourage Indians and Indian advocates. The formulation of the threefold test in this Comment is based primarily on both the Colville holding
and the White Mountain dicta. Indians and Indian advocates may hope
that the Court never announces the threefold test. But to remain inactive
while hoping for such a judicial turn would be both fruitless and dangerous-fruitless because of the consistent trend of the cases toward increasing state incursions on tribal sovereignty over the past 100 years
and dangerous because states will continue to make further incursions
on tribal sovereignty in the courts. Therefore, tribes must take steps to
avoid the grave consequences of the threefold test.
Obviously, in any of the four hypothetical situations, a tribe that
wishes to escape state regulatory jurisdiction would be wise to avoid a
172

Checkerboard jurisdiction means that the different sovereigns-state, fed-

eral, and tribal-have jurisdiction in different parts of Indian country. In other
words, a jurisdictional map of Indian country would look vaguely like a checkerboard. Checkerboard jurisdiction leads to legal uncertainty and weakens the
power and effectiveness of the sovereigns. See R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, supra
note 2, at 152; Will, supra note 19, at 471. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
found that Congress has sought to avoid the creation of checkerboard jurisdiction
in Indian country. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962).
True checkerboard jurisdiction, with clearly defined, squared, and alternating
checkerboard blocks, rarely occurs in Indian country but frequently occurs in the
context of public land law. To induce railroad development in the nineteenth
century, the federal government granted to railroad companies the odd-numbered
lots on both sides of the railroads' right-of-ways, but the government reserved to
itself the even-numbered lots. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668
(1979).
173 See Will, supra note 19, at 471.
174 See id.
175 See COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 4-5; Dolan, supra note 31, at 475.
176 See Note, supra note 5, at 319 n.2.
177 See Will, supra note 19, at 480 n.79, 483-87.
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judicial determinaton. Under the threefold test, with its balancing component, only an express statement of congressional intent to preempt
state environmental laws would assure a tribe of freedom from state
environmental regulation. 1 78 If a tribe must judicially challenge state
regulatory jurisdiction, however, the tribe can improve its chance of
success by seeking increased federal involvement and by increasing
tribal involvement. 179 For example, the tribe could lobby for a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for environmental protection, specific
to Indian country, similar to the Indian trading regulations. Another
possibility is for tribes to seek congressional approval of tribal preemption of state laws ;180 then tribal environmental laws would preclude
state regulation. Even without congressional approval of tribal preemption, tribal environmental laws would improve a tribe's chance of successfully challenging state environmental regulation. 181
CONCLUSION

Despite fluctuating congressional policy since the nation's inception,
the Supreme Court consistently has allowed increasing state incursions
into tribal sovereignty. Although Congress presently supports tribal
self-determination, the Court now is developing a threefold test for
state regulatory jurisdiction that favors state power and de-emphasizes
tribal sovereignty. Under the threefold test, the first question is what,
if any, sources of potential preemption exist. If a source of potential
preemption does exist, then the second question is what is the maximum
possible extent of preemption. If the state law is not explicitly preempted but could be implicitly preempted, then the third question is,
on balance, do state interests outweigh federal and tribal interests and
thus justify state regulatory jurisdiction. In the context of environmental law, where state interest in protecting the public's health and
welfare is particularly strong, tribes should be wary of states that are
likely to exploit the threefold test to exercise unprecedented control in
Indian country.
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See text accompanying notes 112-17 supra.
See notes 143-45 and accompanying text supra.

180 See Colville, 447 U.S. at 156.
181 See note 144 and accompanying text supra. Many factors, however, may
prevent a tribe from enacting its own environmental laws. See Will, supra note
19, at 500.
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